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Abstract 
Providing a secure mobile communication in mixed IPv4/IPv6 networks is a challenging task. One 
of the most critical vulnerabilities associated with the IPv6 protocol is the routing header that potentially 
may be exploited by attackers to bypass the security. This paper discusses an algorithm to secure home 
agent network from the routing header vulnerability, where the home agent network uses IPv4 Network 
Address Translation (NAT) router. The algorithm also takes into account multi-hops destination in the 
routing header. Verification was done through implementation of the algorithm at the Home Agent modul in 
a testbed network. The experimental results show that the proposed algorithm provides secure 
communication between Correspondent nodes and Mobile Nodes that moved into the NATed network 
without causing a significance filtering delay. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the direct incompatibility between IPv4 and IPv6  the security concern in mixed 
IP networks is considered to be one of the most critical issues in mobile Internet Protocol (MIP) 
networks [1]. 
Tunneling technique is being used to support mobility in mixed IP networks. The 
encapsulation of IPv6 packets into IPv4 packets may intruduce new security vulnerabilities, 
because the security devices of the home agent network may not be able to perform deep traffic 
inspection on the IPv6 header that contains routing header (RH). The RH has two types:  RH 
type 0  (RH0) and type 2 (RH2). 
 IPv4 and IPv6 will coexist for a long period of time [2]. During this period, the movement 
of the mobile nodes (MNs) among networks configured with different IP protocols is unavoidable 
[3],[4]. Therefore, mobility support in mixed IPv4 and IPv6 networks has gained vital importance.  
Many researchers have shown interests in proposing new mechanisms to address the 
security issue of IPv4 and IPv6 coexistence with mobility support. Several studies have 
investigated security concerns and implications of MIP such as [5]-[7]. Moreover, authors in [8] 
discuss security issues of IPv4 and IPv6 and also analyze different security threats that may 
emerge due to implementation of various transition mechanisms. Vulnerability can occur due to 
exploitation of the IPv6 RH feature which has been demonstrated and analyzed in many recent 
studies [9]. All the nodes that support IPv6 must be able to process IPv6 RHs. At the same time, 
such vulnerability can be used by attackers to bypass network security through avoiding access 
control lists on  destination addresses.  In this concern, the firewall policy must block forwarding 
packets with type 0 RHs (RH0) and permit other types of RHs (RH2) to pass through. Blocking 
all IPv6 packets containing RHs is, however, not a worthy solution as this could have serious 
implications for the IPv6 future development. Recently, most of firewall policies block all packets 
containing RH0. In addition, the default firewall configuration prevents the forwarding of IPv6 
traffic with RH0. 
The RH functionality which is originally provided by IPv6 can be used to list one or more 
intermediate nodes to be visited on the way to a packet’s destination. At the same time, it can 
be exploited by the attackers to bypass the traffic filtering mechanism and generate a Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack [10],[11]. 
An attacker can exploit the RH in order to generate malicious packets which are 
performed through specifying a victim node’s IP address in the RH. These kinds of packets will 
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be routed through a public accessible IP address (e.g., network server) and some intermediate 
nodes to be finally delivered to the victim host. Certainly, the malicious packets will be subjected 
to a checking process in the server of the intended network. The server forwards these packets 
based on the IP addresses specified in the RH. Thus, the malicious packets will reach the victim 
host without breaking any of security policies as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, all packets which 
are received and passed through the HA must be subjected to an inspection process.  
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. Scenario on Routing Header Attacks 
  
 
2. Research Method 
When a MN moves to a different IP network the tunneling connectivity to the HA is 
accomplished by using IP encapsulation mechanism. The encapsulated packet consists of IPv4-
UDP-IPv6. The first receiver node forwards the packet to the final destination based on the inner 
IPv6 header, and then, the packet is decapsulated and forwarded to the next nodes, whereas; 
the list of IP addresses attached in the RH justifies this process. All of the received packets that 
are in encapsulated format are subject to a filtration process to protect the Home Network (HN) 
from possible spoofing attacks. The purpose of checking the RH is to determine whether the 
type of the RH is either 0 or 2 and either the IPv6 addresses inlcuded in RH2 are valid or not. 
Figure  2 illustrates the algorithm to filter the incoming packets into the Home Agent (HA) 
module. 
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Figure 2. The Proposed Algorithm 
 
 
A testbed has been set up to verify the proposed algorithm. The testbed topology has 
three components as follows (See Figure 3).  
1. IPv6 traffic emulator is designed to generate IPv6 packets including RH0 and RH2 used to 
evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm. Several CNs can simultaneously send 
packet to a MN stay behind NAT router 
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2. The algorithm in home network implemented in the HA. This module receives the packets 
sent through the NAT router and then processes these packets according to the proposed 
algorithm.  
3. HA clients act as MNs moved in into IPv4 only network with NAT. This HA clients are having 
connection with outsiders and obtaining IPv6 addresses from Teredo server. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Testbed Topology for the Experiment 
 
 
Table 1 shows the hardware specifications and the configuration settings for the 
undertaking experiment. 
 
 
Table 1. Hardware Specifications and Configuration Settings  
Installation & 
configuration settings 
Sender Receiver Clients 
Operating System Linux Fedora 13 Linux Fedora 13 Windows 7 
PC manufacturer Acer® PC Acer® PC Dell® PC 
Processor Intel® Core™ 2 CPU, 
E4500 @ 2.20GHz 
Intel® Core™ 2 
CPU, E4500 @ 
2.20GHz 
Intel® Core™ 2 CPU, 
E4500 @ 2.20GHz 
RAM 2 GB 2 GB 4 GB 
Implementation Scapy 2.2.0 , Python C programming 
language 
Configuration 
Traffic Monitoring tool Scapy sniffing function Wireshark, Scapy 
sniffing function 
Wireshark , Scapy sniffing 
function 
IPv6 Address 2404:a8:400:1210:a00
:27ff:fe84:698e 
2404:a8:400:1210:7
99b:8a80:1138:ef02 
C1. 
2404:a8:400:1210:879a:23
c5:7858:ff84 
C2. 
2404:a8:400:1210:685c:a8
78:2239:bf22 
C3. 
2404:a8:400:1210:687a:3b
82:978:ee04 
 
Five scenarios are used in the experiments as follows. 
Scenario 1: multiple CNs send IPv6 packets containing 50% normal packets and 50% 
suspicious packets. Each RH type are conducted 10 runs in the experiment, starting with 500 
packets up to 5000 packets with 500 packets increament. 
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Scenario 2: Five CNs are emulated to craft and send simultaneously 5000 IPv6 packets to the 
HA. Three CNs send IPv6 packets containing RH0, while the rest send packets without RH0. 
According to [12] the majority of observations should be at least 60% of the population as a 
normal packets. Hence, in this paper 70% normal packets (i.e., packets without RH0) and 30% 
malicious (packets that include RH0) are considered to be the representative of the majority of 
the packets. The packets which include RH0 are distributed as follows:  
(1)  20% of the packets have matched IP destination addresses with the authorized list, and  
(2)  10% of those packets have unmatched IP destination addresses (i.e., suspicious packets) 
in the RH. The unmatched packets can be divided into 7% malicious packets and 3% 
normal packets. 
Experiments are conducted for this scenario, and the results  have been subsequently 
used to calculate the accuracy of the proposed algorithm in terms of preventing the HA from 
RH0 vulnerability using Equation (1) and Equation (2). 
 
∗ 100%                     (1) 
 
	 	 	 ∗ 100%            (2) 
 
In this paper, the false positive is defined as the situation in which the actual normal 
packet is detected as an attack. False positive occurres because the proposed algorithm rejects 
all the suspicious packets (i.e., malicious and normal packets) carrying unmatched IPv6 routing 
header addresses. 
 
Scenario 3: Five CNs are emulated to send IPv6 packets to HA clients through NAT and the 
proposed algorithm module in HA. The CNs are  divided into three sets. The first set has two 
nodes which are intended to generate and send suspicious packets with RH2 (containing 
unregistered IPv6 destination address). The second set contains two nodes that generate and 
send packets without RH2. The last set represents an authorized CN which intends to generate 
packets containing RH2 with valid IPv6 destination address. The generated packets sent by the 
authorized CN are specified with only one RH destination IP address per packet. The 
embedded IP addresses within the RH2 must be matched with the home address of the MN that 
has already stored in the IPv6CoA_cache. Total number of packets is 5000. 
 
Scenario 4: Same as Scenario 1, but with the ratio of normal packet to malicious packet is set to 
40% to 60%. 
 
Scenario 5: Same as Scenario 1, but with the ratio of normal packet to malicious packet is set to 
60% to 40%. 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
Two aspects of performances are considered in the experiments; performance in term 
of packet filtering process time and accuracy  in detecting malicious packets. 
 
 
3.1. Filtration Time 
Figure 4 displays the time required to filter the same amount of packets while the size of 
packets also increased in accordance with the IPv6 RH0. The figure also leads to the 
conclusion that when the number of IPv6 RH addresses increase, the time required for the 
filtration process also increased. It is worth noting that the developed algorithm requires more 
time to filtrate the matched packets than unmatched packets. The reason behind this 
observation is that the filtration process for matched packets continues until the last RH IP 
address while in case of unmatched packets the filtering process stops when at least one of 
those IP addresses does not match with the IP addresses in the dataset. Hence, it can be 
concluded that this algorithm performs better considering the time required for filtering the 
unmatched packets.  
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Figure 4. Filter Processing Time vs. Number of IPv6 Packets with RH0 [5]-[24] 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the filtration processing time on RH2 which containing and not 
containing multi-hop IP addresses, and also the one without any security policy in the HA. The 
proposed algorithm affects the network performance in terms of filtering delay. The filtration 
process time for packet containing multi-hop RH2 is higher than non-multi-hop packet.  
 
 
Figure 5. Average Packet Filtering Time on RH2 
 
 
3.2. Accuracy 
 In Figure 6, the plot with red color represents the case when the number of malicious 
packets is greater than normal packets. In this concern, the number of malicious packets is a 
multiple of normal packets. However, the blue line represents the case at which the number of 
normal packets is greater than the malicious packets. Based on this figure, it is obvious that the 
accuracy of the proposed algorithm performs better when the number of malicious packets 
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greater than normal packets. The cause of better accuracy is mainly resulted from the 
decreament of the false positive rate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Accuracy of the Proposed Algorithm on RH0 Based on 31 Observations 
 
 
The extended algorithm has a high accuracy in protecting the home network and 
handles suspicious packets containing multi-hops of RH IP addresses. Compared to no multi-
hop  algorithm, the multi-hop algorithm has accuracy of 97% with a difference of 2%. Figure 7 
shows the accuracy of the proposed algorithm with multi-hop and no multi-hop addresses 
handling. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Accuracy of the Proposed Algorithm on RH2 Packets 
 
 
Two trials (with 31 observations each) are conducted to verify the significance of the 
experimental results. The Mean and Standard Deviation of the first and the second trial are  
(0.97000; 0.018619) and (0.98500;0.009092), respectively. 
The results of the t-test shown in Table 2 present that the proposed algorithm has a 
significant effect on the effectiveness of packet filtration. It is clearly seen that there is a 
significant difference in Mean between trial one and two. The t-test result also indicates a high 
significance for the developed algorithm at (sig = 0.000 < 0.01), i.e. the confidence is greater 
than 95% [13]. 
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Table 2. t-Test For Results Significance 
 
 
Trial   
Levene’s test for 
equality of 
variances 
t-test of equality of Means 
95% confidence interval 
of the diff. 
F Sig. T df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Means 
diff. 
Std. Err. 
Diff. 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variant 
assumed 
15.528 0.000 -4.031 60 0.000 -0.015 0.003721 -0.022414 -0.007556 
Not 
assumed 
  -4.031 43.538 0.000 -0.015 0.003721 -0.022502 - 0.007498 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
An algorithm for securing home agent network in a mobile IPv4/IPv6 mixed network 
from IPv6 routing header vulnerability has been proposed. The proposed algorithm is 
incorporated into the Home Agent of a NATed IPv4 network. Testbed experimental results show 
that the proposed algorithm accurately filter malicious packets coming into the NATed IPv4 
network without significance delay on filtering process. 
This paper focuses only the routing header type 0 and type 2. In future, other 
vulnerabilities in mixed IP network will be considered with the intention of providing seamless 
and secure handover process. 
 
 
References 
[1]  Ahmadi, SM. Analysis Towards Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 in Computer Networks. International 
Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications (IJISA). 2012; 4(4): 33-51. 
[2]  Hong, LX. The Research of Network Transitional Technology from IPv4 to IPv6. Proceedings of the 
4th IEEE International Conference on Digital Manufacturing and Automation (ICDMA).  Shandong. 
2013: 1507-1509. 
[3]  Lee, KH., Jung, HK., Lee, HW., Lee, SK., Han, YH. A Network-Based IP Mobility Management 
Scheme with IPv4/IPv6 Dual Stack Support. In: H-K Jung et. al. Editors. Lecture Notes in Electrical 
Engineering: Future Information Communication Technology and Applications (ICFICE 2013). 
Berlin:Springer. 2013: 199-216. 
[4]  Jun Zhang, Hai Zhao, Bo Yang, Si-yuan Jia. Fractals on IPv6 Network Topology. TELKOMNIKA 
Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering. 2013; 11(2): 577-582. 
[5]  Durdağı, E., Buldu, A. IPv4/IPv6 Security and Threat Comparisons. Procedia-Social and Behavioral 
Sciences. 2010; 2(2): 5285-5291. 
[6]  La Polla, M., Martinelli, F., Sgandurra, D. A Survey on Security for Mobile Devices. IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials. 2013; 15(1): 446 - 471.  
[7]  Zagar, D., Grgic, K., Rimac-Drlje, S. Security Aspects in IPv6 Networks-Implementation and Testing. 
Computers & Electrical Engineering. 2007; 33(5-6): 425-437. 
[8]  Al-Tamimi, BN., Budiarto, R., Omar, MA., Alhendawi, MK. Exploiting IPv6 Routing Headers Type 0/2 
in Different IP Wireless Networks: Attack Scenario & Analysis. Journal of Theoretical and Applied 
Information Technology. 2014; 59(2): 372-378. 
[9]  Karthikeyan, V., Prittopaul.P. A Survey on Vulnerability of Type 0 Routing Header in IPv6. 
International Journal of Computer Science and Management Research. 2013; 2(2): 1671-1676.  
[10]  Wadhwa, M., Khari, M. Security Holes in Contrast to the New Features Emerging in the Next 
Generation Protocol. International Journal of Computer Applications. 2011; 20(3): 35-39.  
[11]  Dac-Nhuong Le. DDoS Attack Defense in Next Generation Networks using Private Security Policy. 
International Journal of Information and Networks Security (IJINS). 2014; 3(3): 
DOI:10.11591/ijins.v3i3.6340. 
[12]  Field, A. Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. Third Edition. London: Sage Publications. 2009. 
[13]  Hair, JF., Black, WC., Babin, BJ., Anderson, RE. Multivariate Data Analysis: A Global Perspective. 
Seventh Edition. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 2010. 
